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Summary
International organizations promote privatization as precondition for economic
development. But is there really too little privatization? This political economy model
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determinants of privatization. Under privatization, governments commit not to in
influence the profit-maximizing employment choice by private investors. With respect
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privatize is detrimental. An improving institutional environment reduces these
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1. Introduction
During the last decade, international organizations have promoted privatization as a pre-
requisite for economic development. The idea is that privatization of the state-owned sector
enhances the eﬃciency and competitiveness of an economy. Empirically, however, the success
of privatization programs is mixed. For some countries, such as the Czech Republic or Russia,
the ﬁrst positive assessments have changed. Kenneth Arrow called the Russian privatization “a
predictable economic disaster”. This does not only concern transition countries: For the British
railroads, recent considerations now include a partial reversal of privatization.
What is the reason for this mixed success of privatization? There seems to be no simple
answer.
1 Theoretical and empirical research is increasingly pointing to political economy expla-
nations: Governments may have interests other than enhancing productive eﬃciency. Inﬂuenced
by their private incentives and lobbies, they may choose privatization when this is not eﬃcient.
Such a privatization can, in turn, strengthen interest groups opposed to further reforms. An
example is the privatization to insiders who oppose a reorganization of the ﬁrm for fear of losing
their jobs (Blanchard and Aghion, 1996). Thus, the success of privatization depends on eﬃcient
incentives of the political leadership, supported by a functioning economic environment.
The World Bank (1995) has formulated the political requirements for a successful privati-
zation: desirability for the political leadership, feasibility, the possibility to create support for
the policy, and credibility, that is, no easy policy reversal. The political economy literature has
so far focused on the feasibility and the credibility of privatization.
2 This paper looks at the
incentives to privatize. It addresses the ﬁrst requirement, the desirability of privatization.
In the existing literature, the incentive to privatize is often explained by a switch of govern-
ment preferences towards eﬃciency.
3 Such a switch in preferences, for example through outside
pressure, is not a satisfying explanation for political decisions. This model compares the pri-
vatization incentives for diﬀerent government types and identiﬁes in this way the determinants
1For an overview of empirical studies see Megginson and Netter (2001) and Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (2003).
2For overviews see Haggard and Webb (1994), Vickers and Yarrow (1994), or Shirley and Walsh (2000).
3Shirley and Walsh (2000), p. 44, state “Instead of maximizing its own rents and power, the government places
a priority on eﬃciency. It can be argued that governments that engage in privatization are not the ones that seek
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of the political choice between privatization and restructuring. Governments interested in rents
and power can very well have incentives to implement privatization programs.
The paper analyzes the incentives to privatize for diﬀerent types of government, a voter-
oriented government, and an egoistic government, which is interested in revenues. The social
planner is used as the benchmark. Governments can privatize or restructure a state-owned ﬁrm.
Under restructuring, the production process of a ﬁrm is reorganized but it remains in state
ownership. To describe the trade-oﬀ for governments in this decision, the model focusses on the
employment choice in the ﬁrm, that is, the input side of production.
The contribution of the paper is threefold: First, it looks at the incentives of governments
in their decision to privatize. Second, once the incentives are identiﬁed, it asks whether or not
they are eﬃcient. For reasons depending on their objective functions, all government types
have incentives to implement privatization programs. These incentives can be ineﬃciently high:
Governments that are not interested in improving the eﬃciency of their economies may destroy
social value by choosing too much privatization. For the voter-oriented government, privatization
is the more eﬀective option to distribute surplus to the voters. The egoistic government may
privatize too much as its revenue-orientation lets it undervalue the social costs of privatization.
Third, the paper asks how these incentives change with the institutional environment of a
country: Better institutions are assumed to improve the prospects of the reorganization of
a ﬁrm both under privatization and restructuring. With better institutions, the ineﬃciency
of incentives to privatize is reduced. This provides an explanation for the higher number of
successful privatization programs in industrialized countries.
The results show that privatization cannot be the panacea for eﬃciency problems in the
state-owned enterprizes sector. Privatization does not always promote eﬃciency. With better
institutions, this problem is reduced but does not disappear.
It is not obvious why governments desire privatization: In his puzzle of selective intervention,
Williamson (1985) asks why privatization should be socially optimal at all. The government
could always imitate a private owner and deviate from this strategy only when this improves
welfare. One approach to tackle this puzzle has been to use the concept of incomplete contracts
(Laﬀont and Tirole (1991), L¨ ulfesmann (2002), Schmidt and Schnitzer (1993), Schmidt (1996)).3 The Political Economy of Privatization
In these models, incomplete contracts create costs of public ownership as the interests of owner
and manager are better aligned in a private ﬁrm. Schmidt (1996) shows that the social planner
uses privatization as a commitment device to create a harder budget constraint for privatized
ﬁrms. This disciplines the manager and enhances productive eﬃciency. Under restructuring,
this commitment is not credible: Ex post, the government always has the incentive to implement
the socially optimal production level. This leads to weakened managerial incentives.
The way the present paper models the diﬀerence between a privatized and a state-owned ﬁrm
is close to Schmidt’s approach. In contrast to Schmidt, the trade-oﬀ for governments is created
not by public good provision but by the employment choice in the ﬁrm: Under privatization, the
private investors choose the employment level. The government commits not to inﬂuence the
employment choice, even if that means higher costs of unemployment. Under restructuring, the
government chooses the employment level according to its own objectives. Any deviation from
the proﬁt-maximizing employment choice reduces the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and lowers the incentives
of the manager. By looking at employment instead of public good provision, the model comes
closer to the situation in transition countries, where privatization concerns ﬁrms producing
normal goods and where unemployment is an important political issue. Employment is a crucial
determinant of privatization strategies. This aspect has so far not been suﬃciently analyzed.
When considerations about political power or private beneﬁts are guiding political decisions,
government oﬃcials trade the expected privatization revenues oﬀ against the option to interfere
with the production process to their own advantage. Bennedsen (2000) compares the realization
of excess labor for a ﬁrm where the government controls labor to the case where the private
owners control labor and both private owners and a labor union can lobby the government. Ex-
cess labor arises when the private owners posses little cash-ﬂow rights. A transfer of control over
labor to private owners weakly decreases excess labor. In a setting without lobbying, Boycko,
Shleifer and Vishny (1996) argue that a government interested in high employment encounters
higher costs when trying to distort the employment level in a privatized ﬁrm. As in Shleifer and
Vishny (1994), privatization is always eﬃciency enhancing. While these models do not explic-
itly consider the decision whether or not to privatize, the results imply that privatization is notThe Political Economy of Privatization 4
attractive for a self-interested government. The present paper comes to the opposite conclusion:
A government interested in high employment can have ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize.
The feasibility of privatization is one of the questions most extensively treated in the political
economy literature on privatization: Given that it has decided to privatize, how can a government
secure political support? Biais and Perotti (2002, 1997) argue that right wing governments use
mass privatization to increase their chance of re-election. When voters become shareholders,
they oppose drastic redistribution measures. Schmidt (2000) shows that mass privatization can
be a commitment against policy reversal and thus secures political support for privatization.
B¨ os and Harms (1997) also make a point for mass privatization: Dispersed owners can control
a management less eﬀectively. Therefore the government has the incentive to mass privatize
whenever the manager has a large political weight.
This literature explains the incentives to use mass privatization instead of other privatization
strategies. It assumes a general preference for privatization. In contrast to that, the present
paper seeks to explain why governments prefer privatization to other policies such as the restruc-
turing the state-owned sector. It does not address the issue of the best privatization method.
However, the choice of the privatization price is integrated in the model: As governments have
diﬀerent incentives to privatize, they may also demand diﬀerent prices for a ﬁrm.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the setup of the model is presented. The next
three sections describe the welfare-oriented, the voter-oriented, and the egoistic government and
their respective choices among the policies privatization and restructuring. The results of the
model are shown in section 6, where the incentives to privatize for the three government types
are compared and the impact of improving institutions are discussed. The results of the model
are illustrated with some empirical observations and related to the existing empirical studies in
section 7. The conclusion summarizes the ﬁndings.
2. The Model
In the model, there is one state-owned ﬁrm. The government can privatize or restructure
the ﬁrm. The paper compares three types of government: The welfare-oriented government
maximizes the social surplus of the economy, the voter-oriented government maximizes its chance5 The Political Economy of Privatization
Figure 1. Government types and policy options
Government types Policy Options
I) Welfare Maximizer 1) Privatization
II) Vote Maximizer 2) Reform of state-owned enterprize
III) Private Beneﬁt Maximizer
of staying in power, and the egoistic government maximizes its own revenue. They all have the
options to privatize (P), or restructure (R) the ﬁrm. The setup is summarized in ﬁgure 1.
Privatization and restructuring are modelled as investments in cost reduction. In both cases,
a manager is needed to reorganize the production process. The success probability of the reorga-
nization is stochastic and depends on the manager’s eﬀort. In case of privatization, the manager
is hired by the private investors. In case of restructuring, the government hires the manager.
The policy option determines the allocation of the right of the employment choice: In case of
privatization, the owners of the ﬁrm choose their preferred employment level without internaliz-
ing the negative eﬀects on unemployment. The government covers the costs of unemployment.
It commits not to interfere with the private employment choice. The credibility of this commit-
ment is assumed exogenously. Credibility can be created by the informational structure in the
subgame after privatization (Schmidt, 1996). After it has privatized the ﬁrm, the government
has no information about the cost structure before observing the unemployment level. Still,
subsidy schemes can be a way to inﬂuence the decisions taken in privatized ﬁrms. Usually,
these subsidies would be associated with additional costs.4 The present model does not allow
these additional channels of inﬂuence. From the point of view of the government, this creates
a disadvantage for privatization. This strengthens the result of the paper that the incentives to
privatize may be sub-optimally high. In case of restructuring, the government has the right to
choose the employment level. Thus, it can internalize the costs of unemployment.
2.1. General Features. Independent of the government type, the model has some general
features: The ﬁrm produces an output with value Y (L), with the input factor labor L ∈ [0;1].
The identic citizens in the economy are of total mass 1 and are all potential workers in the ﬁrm.
4In Schmidt (1996), the government can use subsidies to inﬂuence the production level of the ﬁrm. Then, it
has to give an information rent to the private owner. To reduce the information rent in the good state of the
world, the government hardens the budget constraint for the ﬁrm if high costs realize.The Political Economy of Privatization 6
The proﬁt function of the ﬁrm is deﬁned as
π(L,γk) = Y (L) − (w + γk)L (1)
Y (L) describes a standard production process with Y (L) twice continuously diﬀerentiable, YL >
0, YLL < 0, deﬁned on L ∈ [0;1]. The input price is the ﬁxed wage w. The additional costs to
the input factor γk, k = {g,b}, are eﬃciency losses in the production process. They arise because
of an ineﬃcient organization of the production process where the maintenance of the machines
consumes working time, badly designed logistics, or a suboptimal assignment of workers to their
tasks. Depending on whether the economy is in the good (k = g) or the bad (k = b) state of the
world, there are low or high losses in the production process: γg < γb. The state of the world
is drawn by nature. The probabilities depend on the eﬀort of the manager in the ﬁrm.
When the state of the world with the high costs γb realizes, the costs are too high to keep
up production and the ﬁrm has to be shut down. There is no production and no employment.
No additional costs have to be incurred for the process of closing down the ﬁrm. To model
this explicitly, some kind of ﬁxed costs or a minimum output requirement could be introduced:
When the costs are so high that only a very small fraction of people are employed and output
is very low, production is not possible and the ﬁrm is closed down.
When the low-costs γg realize, the reorganization of the ﬁrm is successful. The owners of the
ﬁrm can then decide on the employment level, depending on their objectives.
To implement the reorganization of the ﬁrm, the owners hire a manager. Managers com-
pete for jobs in a competitive market. A manager has the reservation utility vm = 0. It is
assumed that the manager is risk-neutral, but credit-constrained, so he cannot own the ﬁrm.
The manager’s utility function is given by
vm = wm − e + E[u(π(L))] (2)
where uL > 0 and uLL < 0. The manager derives utility from his wage, he bears the eﬀort costs,
and he gets some private beneﬁts depending on the proﬁt of the ﬁrm. This particular form of
the manager’s utility could be explicitly modelled in a contract that the owners write with the
manager: The manager could get a linear contract thatgives him a certain fraction of the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts (in the form of shares or other titles). Another idea widely used in the theory of the ﬁrm7 The Political Economy of Privatization
is that the manager is interested in consumption on the job or fringe beneﬁts. These increase
when the ﬁrm is more successful.5
It is important that the manager is hired in an incomplete contract setting: The owner of
the ﬁrm can condition the manager’s wage only on the proﬁts of the ﬁrm, but not on the
realized costs γk or on the eﬀort of the manager. Eﬀort is usually assumed to be unobservable
in principal-agent settings. In addition, the eﬃciency costs of production γk have to be non-
veriﬁable to a court. This means that there is an informational asymmetry: Only the owner
and the manager of the ﬁrm observe the level of costs γk.6
These assumptions about the manager’s utility function and the non-veriﬁability of produc-
tion costs are essential in order to create a trade-oﬀ for the social planner between privatization
and restructuring: The government is deprived of the option to oﬀer the manager the optimal
contract conditioning directly on the production costs γk. This potentially creates a disadvan-
tage for restructuring: As the manager is proﬁt-orientated, he shares the objective of proﬁt
maximization with private owners of the ﬁrm. When the government, following other objec-
tives, distorts the employment level, the manager expects to receive less private beneﬁts. As
the government cannot credibly commit not to distort the employment level ex post, it cannot
induce the manager to the same high eﬀort as under privatization.
The manager invests e before the state of the world is drawn by nature. The eﬀort of the
manager inﬂuences the costs of production by changing the probability distribution over the
good and the bad state of the world: At the end of period one, nature draws the good state
of the world γg with probability p(e), and the bad state of the world γb with 1 − p(e) with
p(e) twice continuously diﬀerentiable, pe(e) > 0 and pee(e) < 0. The scope for improvement
of the production process can, in a broad sense, be thought to be determined by the economic
5In assuming this kind of utility function, the model precludes the optimal contract between the owner and
the ﬁrm and the manager. The aim of the paper is to compare private with state ownership. The contractual
form that owners and manager can choose is the same for both cases. As the same distortion is committed twice,
it does not matter for the comparison. For a similar utility function of the manager see Schmidt (1996).
6In a strict sense, the term incomplete contracts describes a world where certain events cannot be included in
a contract because the agents are unable to foresee or anticipate them when writing the contract. The setup here
is not incomplete in this sense: It is possible to anticipate that the production costs will be either high or low.
However, it is still not possible to condition a contract on them as the production costs cannot be veriﬁed to a
court. Even if the costs were included in the draft of the contact, a deviation could thus not be enforced.The Political Economy of Privatization 8
environment, the possibility to monitor workers, or a functioning infrastructure. With better
economic institutions, the eﬀort of the manager may have more impact.
When the low costs state realizes, the owners of the ﬁrm choose the employment level accord-
ing to their objectives. Whenever the employment choice leads to less than full employment
L < 1, the production process creates not only proﬁts but also social costs of w(1 − L), the
unemployment beneﬁts that have to be paid out to the citizens.7 The expected wage for a
citizen in the economy is given by Lw + (1 − L)w. All types of government have to cover the
unemployment costs, even if they are not interested in the well-being of their population.
The redistribution process is not without frictions. As is commonly assumed in the litera-
ture, the government has a “leaky bucket”: Of every unit of money that passes through the
government’s hands before reaching the citizens, a fraction λ, λ ∈ [0;1], is lost (e.g. due to ad-
ministrative transaction costs or the costs of maintaining a bureaucracy). The revenue needed
to cover the unemployment costs thus amounts to (1 + λ)w(1 − L). The assumption has the
purpose to distinguish the social planner from the other government types. Only for the social
planner, the questions of who appropriates revenues and how a surplus is redistributed does not
play a role. Note that also the social planner is constrained to cover the unemployment costs.
As this model focusses on the employment choice as the motive for privatization, the incentive
to privatize in order to create revenue to ﬁnance other policy projects is not considered. All
governments are endowed with the same initial funds E, where E > 0 is high enough to cover
all possible realizations of unemployment costs. Thus, any incentives for the government that
could stem from a tight budget constraint are excluded from the model.8
2.2. Privatization. Some features of the privatization subgame are independent of the govern-
ments’ objective function and are equal for all government types. If the government chooses to
privatize in the beginning of period 1, it makes a take-it or leave-it oﬀer to the citizens. The
citizens then become investors. By assumption, the investors face no credit constraint, so the
7Other costs of unemployment, such as reintegration costs or disutilities of the unemployed are not considered.
8The need to create revenue is certainly a very important incentive to privatize for governments of all types. A
thorough analysis of this question would, however, need a diﬀerent theoretical framework: The trade-oﬀ between
realizing a gain form privatization once and receiving lower revenue for a longer period of time from a state-owned
ﬁrm is best captured in a dynamic or at least, multi-period model. Furthermore, taxes and the possibility of
government debt would have to be included in the model.9 The Political Economy of Privatization
privatization price can be expressed in expected terms.9 The price for the ﬁrm, aX, is a fraction
a ∈ [0;1] of the expected present value of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, denoted by X = p(e)π(LP) − wm
P ,
so no further discounting is needed. In the privatization price, the manager’s wage is included.
This means that the investors always buy the ﬁrm when the government decides to privatize.
Furthermore, it is always optimal for the investors to hire a manager and oﬀer him the wage
wm
P . They will, in expectation, always make positive proﬁts.
The government chooses a according to its objective function. With a = 1, the government
auctions oﬀ the ﬁrm and appropriates the expected proﬁts. If the government chooses a = 0,
it gives away the ﬁrm for free. This is comparable to voucher privatization, which has been
applied, for example, in the Czech Republic or Russia. The vouchers serve as a currency to buy
shares and are distributed to the population for free. For all intermediate cases 0 < a < 1, the
government uses underpricing, leaving some of the ﬁrm’s surplus to the investors. The choice of
the privatization price thus captures a basic diﬀerence of privatization strategies. On the other
hand, the model does not allow to deﬁne the number of buyers (the ﬁrm is sold to all citizens).
In the privatization subgame, the risk-neutral private investors hire a manager and oﬀer him
a wage. The wage cannot condition directly on the costs of production but only on the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts. The manager decides on his eﬀort level anticipating the employment choice and the
ﬁrm’s proﬁts for the two possible states of the world in period 2. In his eﬀort choice, the







With monotonicity and concavity of p(e) and u(π), this uniquely deﬁnes the success probability
of the reorganization of the ﬁrm after privatization Prob(γg) = pP. The owners of the ﬁrm
anticipate this eﬀort choice and oﬀer the manager the ﬁxed wage wm
P = eP − pPu(π(LP)),
holding his utility down to his reservation utility. As the manager derives some private beneﬁts
from the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, the owners do not have to compensate his full eﬀort costs.
When the reform has been a success, the investors choose the employment level L in order
to maximize the ﬁrm’s proﬁts: LP = argmax[π(L,γg)] = argmax[Y (L) − (w + γg)L]. The
9If the investors were credit constrained, the government could not charge a positive price for the ﬁrm as the
investors would not be able to pay in the bad state of the world.The Political Economy of Privatization 10
employment level under privatization LP is given implicitly by
∂Y (L)
∂L
= w + γg (4)
The investors choose the proﬁt maximizing employment without taking into account the exter-
nality of higher unemployment costs. The government has to bear these costs without having
any possibility to interfere in the production process.
2.3. Restructuring. When the government decides to restructure, it remains the owner of the
ﬁrm and chooses the employment level. This choice depends its objectives. The restructuring
subgame is discussed separately for the three government types in the following sections.
2.4. Time Structure. In period 0, the ﬁrm is state-owned. The production process has not
been reorganized and the eﬃciency costs of production are high. That means that the ﬁrm has
to be shut down for sure if no reform is undertaken. Thus, all types of government have the
incentive to undertake one of the two reforms, privatization or restructuring.10
In the beginning of period 1, the government restructures or privatizes the ﬁrm. Then, the
respective owner of the ﬁrm hires a manager. The manager reorganizes the production process
by investing e in period 1, before the state of the world realizes. The success probability of
reform is given by p(e). With probability 1 − p(e), the reform fails and the ﬁrm is shut down.
In the beginning of period 2, nature draws the state of the world γk with the probabilities
deﬁned by the manager’s investment. If the reform has been successful, the owner of the ﬁrm
decides on the input labor L. At the end of period 2, the output is produced and the payoﬀs
are realized. The time structure of the model is summarized in ﬁgure 2.
Figure 2. Time structure
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
SOE, γb Government decides on P or R
Manager is hired and chooses e
Nature draws state of world





10Under which circumstances reforms are undertaken at all is a further interesting question. As the focus on
the paper lies on the decision to privatize, this option is not modelled here.11 The Political Economy of Privatization
2.5. Technical Assumptions. This section describes the technical assumptions needed to en-
sure internal solutions and to make the model mathematically smooth.
Asssumption 1. limL→0 YL = ∞ and limL→1 YL = 0
Asssumption 2. lime→0 pe = ∞ and lime→∞ pe = 0
Asssumption 3. γg > λw, w > (1 + λ)w
Asssumption 4. Y (1) ≥ w + γg
Asssumption 5. A higher employment level also leads to a higher expected employment level:
For ˆ L > L,pˆ L
ˆ L > pLL.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are Inada-type conditions that ensure internal solutions for the eﬀort
choice of the manager and, together with assumption 3, for the employment choices of all govern-
ment types. Assumption 4 ensures that proﬁts in the low cost state are positive for all possible
employment levels. No ﬁrm is kept in operation with a successful reform but still negative prof-
its. Assumption 5 concerns the relation between employment levels and the success probabilities
of reform. It is needed in order to capture the positive aspects of a higher employment level in
the state-owned enterprize also in expected terms. It is important for all cases where L > LP:
Then, a higher employment level means lower proﬁts of the ﬁrm. This leads to a lower eﬀort of
the manager and thus decreasing probabilities for the low-costs state of the world.
3. The welfare-oriented government
The case of the social planner is used as the benchmark to evaluate the decisions of the other
two government types. The welfare-oriented government chooses the policy that maximizes
social welfare. Given the policy alternative, it undertakes all measures to maximize welfare.
The model is solved by backward induction. It is ﬁrst described how the government acts to
maximize its objective function given privatization or restructuring. These two maximal values
of the objective function are then compared to derive the conditions for the decision to privatize
or restructure. The same approach is later used for the other government types.The Political Economy of Privatization 12
Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of all beneﬁts and costs in the economy, except for the
utility of the manager. The manager is deliberately left out of the welfare analysis: First, the
social planner would be the only type of government to consider the manager’s utility. This
means that all comparisons with other government types would depend on the assumptions on
the manager’s utility function. Second, realistically, the policy choice between privatization and
restructuring should not depend on the utility of a single manager. Thus, it would be necessary
to calibrate the manager’s utility function so that it does not outweigh all other eﬀects. The
easiest way to solve that problem is to exclude the manager from the welfare analysis.11
3.1. Privatization. If the social planner privatizes the ﬁrm, the investors hire a manager and
decide on employment as described in section 2.2. Under privatization, welfare is given by
WP = pPπ(LP) + pPwLP − λw(1 − pPLP) + E (5)
Note that the privatization price aX is not relevant for the social planner: Who appropriates
the proﬁts of the ﬁrm has no consequences for welfare. However, the ineﬃciencies in redis-
tribution are important. Therefore, the government will not redistribute any revenues above
the minimal amount needed to pay the unemployment beneﬁts. The model assumes domestic
privatization. If the ﬁrm were to be sold to foreign investors, the social planner would set the
maximal privatization price a = 1.
3.2. Restructuring. If the welfare-oriented government decides to restructure the ﬁrm, it hires
a manager. At the beginning of period 2, the government observes the state of the world γk.
When the reorganization of the ﬁrm has been successful (the low cost state of the world γg has
realized), the social planner chooses the employment level in order to maximize its objective
function W(L): LR = argmax[W(L,γg)] = argmax[Y (L)−γgL−λw(1−L)]. The employment
level under restructuring LR is then given implicitly by
∂Y (L)
∂L
= γ − λw (6)
Note that with Y (L) concave, LR > LP. When the government owns the ﬁrm, it can internalize
the unemployment costs. As being employed gives a higher utility to a citizen, the government
11Even for transition countries, where privatization programs concern many ﬁrms at once, the number of
managers always is small compared to the number of people employed in these ﬁrms.13 The Political Economy of Privatization
wants to employ more people than the private owner. On the other hand, the revenues from the
proﬁts of the ﬁrm are then lower as LR is higher than the proﬁt-maximizing employment level.
In period 1, the government hires a manager who invests in reorganizing the production








This also uniquely deﬁnes the success probability of the reorganization after restructuring
Prob(γg) = pR. The ﬁxed wage oﬀered by the government then is wm
R = eR − pRu(π(LR)).
Lemma 1. The eﬀort the manager exerts and the probability for the low-cost state of the world
γg is higher under privatization than under restructuring: eP > eR and pP > pR.
Proof. Employment under restructuring LR is higher than the proﬁt-maximizing employment
level LP. Therefore, the proﬁts of the ﬁrm are lower under restructuring. u(π) is increasing
in π, and p(e) is strictly concave in e. Thus, the ﬁrst order condition for the manager’s eﬀort
choice is fulﬁlled by a larger e in the case of privatization. pP > pR follows from pe(e) > 0. 
In the restructuring subgame, it is of particular importance that the wage cannot condition
directly on the costs of production but only on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. The government distorts the
proﬁts because it chooses a higher employment level than under privatization. The manager,
who derives private beneﬁts from the proﬁts, decides on his eﬀort level anticipating this proﬁt
distortion. This leads to the “ratchet eﬀect”: The government reduces the reward for the
investment of the manager in the good state of the world. In the bad state of the world, the ﬁrm
is closed down. Thus, there is a hard budget constraint of the ﬁrm. Note that the government
cannot credibly commit to a higher proﬁt level. Ex post, after the eﬀort choice of the manager,
it always has the incentive to choose the higher socially optimal employment. The manager
anticipates this and invests accordingly less eﬀort.12 Welfare in the case of restructuring then is
WR = pRπ(LR) + pRwLR − λw(1 − pRLR) + E (8)
12Renegotiations for higher eﬀort in exchange for lower employment would not qualitatively change the results.
See Schmidt (1996, p.12). Renegotiations are not considered in this model as the focus lies on the comparison of
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3.3. Policy choice of the welfare-oriented government. By comparing the welfare levels
for the two policy options, it is now possible to determine when privatization is socially optimal.
Proposition 1. The welfare-oriented government privatizes if and only if WP > WR. This is
the case when
pPπ(LP) − pRπ(LR) > (w + λw)(pRLR − pPLP) (9)
Proof. Condition 9 is derived from 5 and 8. After ﬁxing the parameter values, the curvature of
the probability function pee(e) can be adjusted for results in either way. If the social planner
privatizes, pee(e) should not be too small (the curvature of p(e) should not be too strong). 
Condition 9 shows the trade-oﬀ for the social planner: On the one hand, privatization enhances
productive eﬃciency. The proﬁt of the ﬁrm is higher as the owners choose the proﬁt-maximizing
employment level. In addition, this leads to a higher eﬀort of the manager and a higher suc-
cess probability of reform. This further increases the diﬀerence of expected proﬁts between
privatization and restructuring.
On the other hand, restructuring allows for the choice of the socially optimal employment
level. The right hand side of condition 9 shows the gains from restructuring: A higher expected
employment level means that more citizens receive the wage w. In addition, lower unemployment
also saves on the redistribution losses λw. Proposition 1 is now used as the benchmark to evaluate
the policy choices of the voter-oriented and the egoistic governments.
4. The voter-oriented government
The voter-oriented government maximizes its chance of reelection. Ex ante, all voters are
identic. They vote for the candidate who oﬀers them the largest expected surplus. There are
no veto players or special interest groups. The electoral competition is not modelled explicitly.
Elections are assumed to happen just before period 0. They are won on the basis of the expected
payoﬀs for the voters in the next period. The incumbent and the challenger fully commit to
their promised policies. By assumption, the challenger in the elections promises the voters the
political program that gives them the highest expected income. The incumbent government15 The Political Economy of Privatization
thus has the incentive to maximize the surplus it can distribute to the voters. Otherwise, the
challenger has the opportunity to promise a higher surplus and win the elections.13
4.1. Privatization. If the voter-oriented government privatizes the ﬁrm, the investors decide
on employment as described in section 2.2. The government’s objectives are then given by
VP = pPπP(LP) − aX + pPwLP +
1
1 + λ
[E + aX] (10)
The last term describes the redistribution of government revenue: The government gives its
endowment and its privatization revenue to the voters to maximize their payoﬀ. The unemploy-
ment beneﬁts are included in that amount. The redistribution leaves the fraction 1
1+λ to the
voters, the rest is lost. The government chooses the privatization prize aX to maximize VP.
Lemma 2. The voter-oriented government uses underpricing. It chooses the lowest possible
privatization price a = 0.
Proof. After simpliﬁcation, a enters VP with − λ
(1+λ)aX. That is, any reduction of a increases
VP. Thus, a is chosen as low as possible. 
Any redistribution of government revenue entails the loss of a fraction λ of the amount that
reaches the citizens. These eﬃciency losses give the government the incentive to use underpricing
to increase the revenue of its voters. The government’s payoﬀ from privatization thus is




4.2. Restructuring. The objective of the government is to maximize the voters’ expected sur-
plus. Voters receive the expected wage. In addition, the government distributes its endowment
and all proﬁts from the ﬁrm to the voters. Unemployment payments are included in this sum.
The redistribution process creates costs of λ times the net revenue of the voters.
VR = p(e)wL +
1
(1 + λ)
[E + p(e)π(L)] (12)
13There are many ways to model electoral competition. The assumption of pre-election politics totally excludes
the possibility that some groups of voters may not vote for the government because they suﬀer from a policy ex
post. The inclusion of veto players would imply changed incentives both for restructuring and privatization. For
example, if voters were to vote by retrospection, the unemployed would probably be against privatization. On
the other hand, workers might support privatizing governments when they become shareholders. This simpler
model thus does not predetermine the solutions. Biais and Perotti (2002) and Schmidt (2000) use such more
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When restructuring is successful, the voter-oriented government chooses employment in order
to maximize its objective function VR: LV = argmax[VR(L,γg)] = argmax[wL + 1
(1+λ)π(L)].
The employment level under restructuring LV is then given implicitly by
∂Y (L)
∂L
= γg − λw (13)




∂L |LR and therefore LV > LR. The
employment level chosen by the voter-oriented government is higher than the socially optimal
employment level. The reason is that the voter-oriented government uses employment as a way
to distribute revenue to the voters. The wage is welfare-neutral. As it is paid out directly by the
ﬁrm, there are no redistribution losses. The voter-oriented government overvalues the positive
aspect of wage payments: The redistribution of proﬁts of the ﬁrm entails losses of λ. The wages
as part of the production costs are thus discounted by λ. On the other hand, for the utility of
the citizens from the expected wage, the full wage payment is taken into account.
In period 1, the government hires a manager who invests in reorganizing the production
process. The manager’s utility function and his wage are similar to the ones discussed above.







This also uniquely deﬁnes the success probability of a reorganization after restructuring for the
voter-oriented government Prob(γg) = pV .
Lemma 3. The eﬀort the manager exerts and the probability for the low-cost state of the world
γg is lower when he is employed by the voter-oriented government than when he is employed by
the social planner: eP > eR > eV and pP > pR > pV .
Proof. The voter-oriented government chooses an employment level that is higher than the so-
cially optimal employment level under restructuring, LV > LR. Therefore, the voter-oriented
government receives even less proﬁts of the ﬁrm, π(LV ) < π(LR). As this also leads to
u(π(LV )) < u(π(LR)), the ﬁrst order condition for the manager’s eﬀort choice is fulﬁlled by
a smaller e in the case of voter-oriented restructuring. As p(e) is increasing in e, a lower eﬀort
unambiguously leads to a lower probability of the low-cost state of the world. 17 The Political Economy of Privatization
Given the employment choice, the payoﬀ for the voter-oriented government is
VR = pV wLV +
1
1 + λ
[E + pV πV (LV )] (15)
4.3. Policy choice of the voter-oriented government. It is now possible to determine the
condition for the policy choice of the voter-oriented government





pV π(LV ) > w(pV LV − pPLP) (16)
Proof. Condition 16 is derived directly from equations 11 and 15. 
Also for the voter-oriented government, privatization is attractive because it leads to higher
proﬁts. Because of the higher employment level, proﬁts under restructuring are here even lower.
As the government has the incentive to distribute the ﬁrm’s proﬁts to the voters, it has to incur
the redistribution losses. Therefore, the expected proﬁt from restructuring pV π(LV ) is further
reduced by 1
1+λ. Privatization together with underpricing gives the ﬁrm’s proﬁts directly to the
citizens and saves on these additional costs.
The diﬀerence to the social planner is that the voter-oriented government has the incentive
to maximize the payoﬀ of the voters in the short term, in spite of the redistribution losses that
have to be incurred. Although legislative periods are not explicitly modelled, implicitly the
government only cares about the coming elections. It has no incentive to engage in long-term
considerations or to keep revenue for later investments. The challenger would immediately use
this for his own advantage, distribute all available revenue to the voters and win the elections.
Both the voter-oriented government and the social planner see the advantage of restructur-
ing in the higher employment level. The reasons are, however, diﬀerent: Whereas the social
planner internalizes the unemployment costs, the voter-oriented government is interested in in-
creasing expected wage payments. Thus, for the voter-oriented government, the attractiveness
of restructuring is weighed with the wage w (see right hand side of condition 16).The Political Economy of Privatization 18
5. The egoistic government
The egoistic government maximizes its own expected revenues. They comprise the priva-
tization price or the proﬁts of the ﬁrm after restructuring. In contrast to the voter-oriented
government, it is not interested in distributing these gains to the citizens. Whether the money
goes into the private pockets of politicians or is kept for other political projects is not modelled.
The egoistic government pays the unemployment costs even if it does not care about its citizens.
This is plausible as all political leaders have to ensure some minimum living conditions for their
citizens to secure their political power and reduce the incentives for a revolution.
5.1. Privatization. If the government privatizes the ﬁrm, the investors decide on employment
as described in section 2.2. The government receives the privatization proceeds aX and has to
come up for the unemployment costs. The objectives of the egoistic government are given by
UP = aX − (1 + λ)w(1 − pPLP) + E (17)
The egoistic government chooses the privatization prize aX to maximize UP.
Lemma 4. The egoistic government chooses the highest possible privatization price a = 1.
Proof. a enters UP positively. To maximize UP, a is chosen as large as possible. 
The government’s revenue stems from privatization. It is not interested in the utility of the
citizens. Therefore, it demands the full expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm as privatization price. Using
this result, the government payoﬀ from privatization is
UP = pPπ(LP) − (1 + λ)w(1 − pPLP) + E (18)
5.2. Restructuring. The objective of the government is to create as much expected revenue
as possible. However, it also has to cover the unemployment costs:
UR = p(e)π(L) − (1 + λ)w(1 − p(e)L) + E (19)
When, after restructuring, the reform is successful, the voter-oriented government chooses
the employment level in period 2 in order to maximize its objective function UR: LU =19 The Political Economy of Privatization
argmax[UR(L,γg)] = argmax[p(e)π(L) − (1 + λ)w(1 − p(e)L) + E]. The employment level
under restructuring LU is then given implicitly by
∂Y (L)
∂L









∂L |LP and LU > LP. The
egoistic government chooses a lower employment level than the social planner. As it does not
care about the well-being of the voters, it counts the total unemployment payments as costs.
The social planner only considers the eﬃciency losses of redistribution. In contrast to the private
investors, the egoistic government internalizes the consequences of unemployment. Therefore, it
chooses an employment level larger than LP, even though it is proﬁt-oriented.







This also uniquely deﬁnes the success probability of the reform Prob(γg) = pU.
Lemma 5. The eﬀort the manager exerts and the probability for the low-cost state of the world
γg is higher when he is employed by the egoistic government than when he is employed by the
social planner, but still lower than in the case of privatization: eP > eU > eR and pP > pU > pR.
Proof. The lower employment level LU < LR chosen by the egoistic government leads to higher
proﬁts of the ﬁrm than for the social planner, π(LU) > π(LR). This means higher private
beneﬁts for the manager, u(π(LU)) > u(π(LR)). Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition for the
manager’s eﬀort choice is fulﬁlled by a lager e. As p(e) is increasing in e, this unambiguously
leads to a higher probability of the low-cost state of the world. 
The payoﬀ from restructuring for the egoistic government is
UR = pUπ(LU) − (1 + λ)w(1 − pULU) + E (22)
5.3. Policy choice of the egoistic government. It is now possible to determine the condi-
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Proposition 3. The egoistic government privatizes if and only if UP > UR. This is the case
when
pPπ(LP) − pUπ(LU) > (1 + λ)w(pULU − pPLP) (23)
Proof. Condition 23 is derived directly from equations 18 and 22. 
Privatization again leads to higher proﬁts. The egoistic government trades that oﬀ against
the possibility to choose the employment level under restructuring where it can internalize the
unemployment costs. This, however, means lower proﬁts and a lower eﬀort of the manager. This
further reduces expected proﬁts from restructuring. The diﬀerence to the social planner is that
the egoistic government considers the full costs of unemployment instead of the eﬃciency losses
of redistribution when choosing its preferred employment level under restructuring.
6. Incentives for Privatization and Restructuring
Do governments have eﬃcient incentives to privatize? This question is answered by comparing
the incentives to privatize of the diﬀerent governments to those of the social planner. Each gov-
ernment faces the basic trade-oﬀ of increasing the productivity of the economy by privatization
and its other objectives, such as pleasing voters or creating private revenue.
6.1. Incentives of the Voter-oriented Government.
Proposition 4. The voter-oriented government has ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize





pV π(LV ) + λw(pRLR − pPLP) > w(pV LV − pRLR)
Proof. Condition 4 is directly derived from equations 5, 8, 11, and 15. 
The incentives of the voter-oriented government are shaped by three eﬀects: The proﬁt ef-
fect, the redistribution eﬀect, and the employment eﬀect. First, the proﬁt eﬀect distorts its
incentives towards too much privatization. By choosing the higher employment level LV , the
voter-oriented government decreases the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm under restructuring. In
addition, to maximize its chance of re-election, it has the incentive to distribute all available21 The Political Economy of Privatization
surplus to the voters. This redistribution entails eﬃciency losses. These costs render the option
of restructuring, where the government receives the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, less attractive. Privatization
saves on these redistribution losses. The government chooses privatization as the cheaper way
of increasing the expected payoﬀ of the voters.14
Second, the voter-oriented government does not consider an advantage of restructuring,
namely that higher employment reduces the eﬃciency losses from unemployment payments.
This is the redistribution eﬀect. It is intuitive as the voter-oriented government distributes all
its revenues and its initial endowment; unemployment payments are just a part of it. If there
is less unemployment, the government is just left with more of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts that it gives to
the voters. The neglect of this advantage of restructuring makes privatization relatively more
attractive for the voter-oriented government. Incentives to privatize are distorted upwards.
The third eﬀect, the employment eﬀect, works in the other direction. The voter-oriented
government chooses a higher than socially optimal employment level. The reason is that this
increases the expected wage of the voters. Employment is chosen as a means of redistribution.
Thus, for the voter-oriented government, the right to choose the employment level constitutes
an advantage of restructuring and makes privatization relatively less attractive.
Depending on which eﬀect is strongest, incentives to privatize can be either too low or too
high. This depends on the exact shape of the production function and the probability function.
To better understand the intuition for this result, consider the case where the government is
not able to choose the employment level according to its objectives. Assume that it has to take
the socially optimal employment level LR as given. Employment levels, proﬁts, manager eﬀort
and the probabilities for the states of the world remain unchanged. A rationale for this could
be that not the politicians themselves decide about the labor used in the ﬁrm but that they
delegate the decision to the bureaucracy. The bureaucrats might have interests other than the
short-term objectives of the politicians. One of them might be to act in the social interest. Then,
ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize can stem only from the diﬀerent objective functions.
14It is not crucial for this result that privatization does not entail eﬃciency losses at all. The only requirement
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Corollary 1. When the voter-oriented government takes the socially optimal employment level
LR as given, it has ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize.
Proof. The voter-oriented government has ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize if and only if
λ
1+λpRπ(LR)+λw(pRLR−pPLP) > 0. As expected proﬁts are positive and expected employment
is higher under restructuring due to assumption 5, this condition is always fulﬁlled. 
When it cannot inﬂuence the employment level, the voter-oriented government always has
ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize. The employment eﬀect that constitutes the advantage of
restructuring has disappeared. The proﬁt eﬀect is reduced: As expected proﬁts are the same for
all governments, only the losses from redistribution increase the attractiveness of privatization.
The second eﬀect, the neglect of savings on the eﬃciency losses of unemployment payments,
remains unchanged. Only the employment eﬀect distorts the incentives of the voter-oriented
government towards too little privatization. Whenever the employment eﬀect is not very strong,
the voter-oriented government thus has ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize, even if it then
foregoes the right to choose employment.
This result captures the short-sightedness of democratic governments: In order to increase the
income of the voters in the short term, the government chooses to privatize even in cases where
it would have been optimal to restructure. The voter-oriented government is unable to take into
account that restructuring may have better long-term eﬀects. This failure of governments to
ﬁrst restructure a ﬁrm and then sell it as a “cash cow”, creating a larger revenue, can often be
observed. This mechanism can only be overcome by a strong employment eﬀect.
6.2. Incentives of the Egoistic Government.
Proposition 5. The egoistic government has ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize when the
proﬁt eﬀect is relatively weak. This is the case if and only if UP − UR > WP − WR, that is
w(pRLR − pPLP) − w(pULU − pPLP) + λw(pRLR − pULU) > pUπ(LU) − pRπ(LR) (24)
Proof. Condition 5 is directly derived from equations 5, 8, 18 and 22. 
Also for the egoistic government, three eﬀects shape the incentives to privatize: The labor
cost eﬀect, the unemployment eﬀect, and the proﬁt eﬀect. First, the labor cost eﬀect, w(pRLR−23 The Political Economy of Privatization
pPLP) − w(pULU − pPLP), always distorts the incentives of the egoistic government towards
too much privatization. The intuition is the following: The egoistic government sees wages only
as a part of the production costs of the ﬁrm. In contrast to the social planner, it does not
consider the positive eﬀect of wages. w(pRLR − pPLP) describes this undervaluation of wages
and employment by the egoistic government. The egoistic government does, however, internalize
the unemployment payments. This makes restructuring more attractive. In total, as w > w,
this positive aspect of restructuring cannot compensate for the losses of higher wage payments.
Second, the unemployment eﬀect makes restructuring for the egoistic government relatively
less attractive: Like the social planner, it considers the eﬃciency losses from unemployment
payments. The disadvantage of restructuring stems from the employment choice: By choosing
the lower expected employment level pULU, the egoistic government reduces the savings of
redistribution losses that could be realized by restructuring.
Third, via the proﬁt eﬀect, restructuring has a positive aspect for the egoistic government: By
choosing a lower employment level than the social planner the egoistic government increases the
revenues from the ﬁrm with respect to the proﬁt π(LR) for the social planner. The possibility
to choose the employment level constitutes the incentive to restructure.
For the egoistic government, privatization is attractive as it saves on the labor costs, even
net of additional unemployment costs. Furthermore, the additional redistribution losses from
unemployment are not as high as for the social planner. On the other hand, restructuring is
attractive because it allows to adjust the employment choice to realize higher proﬁts and at the
same time internalize the costs of unemployment.
Also here, it helps to consider the case where the government cannot choose the employment
level according to its objectives but takes the socially optimal employment level LR as given.
Corollary 2. When the egoistic government takes the socially optimal employment level LR as
given, it has ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize.
Proof. The egoistic government has ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize if and only if w(pRLR−
pPLP) − w(pRLR − pPLP) > 0. As w > w by assumption, the result follows directly. The Political Economy of Privatization 24
When it cannot inﬂuence the employment level, the egoistic government always has ineﬃ-
ciently high incentives to privatize. As it does not redistribute any proﬁts of the ﬁrm, the
egoistic government is in this respect not diﬀerent from the social planner. The proﬁt eﬀect
does not play a role. For the egoistic government, wages only count as costs. This labor cost
eﬀect makes privatization attractive. For the egoistic government, only the proﬁt eﬀect can dis-
tort the incentives towards too little privatization. That means that whenever the proﬁt eﬀect
is not very strong, this government type has ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize. Without
a free employment choice, incentives to privatize are always too high.
The main result of the model can be summarized as follows: In particular governments that
have other objectives than improving productive eﬃciency have incentives to choose privatiza-
tion. Moreover, these incentives can be ineﬃciently high. Privatization programs are selected
in cases where a restructuring of the state-owned ﬁrm would have been the better option. This
seems surprising as the existing literature so far shows that non-benevolent governments do not
have incentives to implement privatization programs. At a closer look, however, it becomes clear
that there are additional eﬀects which have so far been neglected in the literature.
What determines these results? In the present model, the political leadership can take several
actions to reach its objectives: In case of privatization, it can choose the privatization price.
In case of restructuring, it can choose the employment level according to its objectives, only
constrained by the unemployment payments. Furthermore, the government always has the
possibility to redistribute revenue to its citizens.
A consideration of these additional channels of political action is important. Their neglect
leads to the result that governments with objectives other than productive eﬃciency would have
no incentives to privatize at all. This is implied by Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996). Their
model focusses exclusively on the employment choice. It is more costly for the politician to
inﬂuence the employment level when the ﬁrm is privatized as the employment decision then lies
with the manager and the shareholders of the ﬁrm.
The present model considers diﬀerent government types. The voter-oriented government is
best comparable to the government in Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996), as it is interested
in high employment: Also in the present model, the employment eﬀect decreases incentives to25 The Political Economy of Privatization
privatize. The proﬁt eﬀect and the redistribution eﬀect, however, distort incentives towards
privatization. If only the employment eﬀect were present, the results of this model would be
the same as in the existing literature. Thus, the additional possibilities of redistributing proﬁts
determine the diﬀerence in the results: The incentive to redistribute government revenue leads
to ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize. For the egoistic government, incentives to privatize
arise due to its proﬁt orientation.
6.3. The Impact of Institutions. After this discussion, naturally the question arises whether
the government incentives may diﬀer not only according to the government type but also de-
pending on the economic environment in a country. Better institutions are assumed to improve
the prospects of the reorganization of a ﬁrm both under privatization and restructuring. They
describe a better functioning economic and bureaucratic environment: Business transactions are
easier, markets are more liquid and provide more opportunities, there are more business partners
and bureaucratic hurdles for investments are reduced.
For the model, this translates into the success probabilities of the reorganization of the ﬁrm
both under privatization and restructuring: A reform is successful when the manager is able to
reduce the production costs to the low cost level γg. The more eﬀective the investment e of the
manager, the more likely is the successful reorganization of the ﬁrm. With better institutions,
a higher eﬀort of the manager should have a higher impact. Formally, with better institutions
(BI), the marginal impact of the manager’s eﬀort decreases more slowly for higher eﬀort levels
than with weak institutions: pBI
ee (e) > pee(e) with pBI(0) = p(0) = 0. The new probability
function has a lower curvature to make every marginal increase of eﬀort more rewarding.15
For mathematical simplicity, an additional assumption is made: pBI(e) = p(e) ∀e ≤ eU. A
higher eﬀort is only more rewarding under privatization. Under restructuring, the situation
remains unchanged for all government types. While this makes the calculations tractable it does
not change the qualitative results: In the more general case, the largest probability diﬀerence
would be that under privatization, pP(eBI
P )−pP(eP). Normalizing all smaller diﬀerences to zero
does not destroy the qualitative results for the trade-oﬀ between privatization and restructuring.
15Comparative statics could also be done with the cost parameter γg. Yet, all results would then depend on
the form of the production function as this determines the employment choices. Therefore, a discussion of these
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For all government types, these assumptions create an advantage for privatization: The ex-
pected proﬁts under privatization are increased. Furthermore, with a higher success probability
of reform after privatization, the expected employment under privatization increases. It is thus
very intuitive that incentives to privatize increase for all three governments considered in this
model: Conditions 9, 16, and 23 can now all be fulﬁlled for larger parameter ranges.
How is the eﬃciency of incentives to privatize aﬀected by better institutions? When the
incentives to privatize increase more for the social planner than for the other government types,
better institutions could reduce the ineﬃciency of the incentives to privatize.
Proposition 6. For all government types, better institutions increase the incentives to privatize
the ﬁrm. For both the voter-oriented and the egoistic government, better institutions reduce the
ineﬃciency of incentives to privatize.
Proof. See appendix. 
Intuitively, this result is driven by the decrease in expected unemployment under privatization:
Whereas the higher proﬁts from privatization concern all government types in the same way,
the diﬀerence lies in their consideration of wages and unemployment payments.
For the voter-oriented government, the ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize are reduced as
a higher success probability of privatization diminishes the expected redistribution losses from
unemployment. Expected unemployment under privatization is now lower. The redistribution
eﬀect which distorts privatization incentives upwards, is reduced. The proﬁt eﬀect remains
unaﬀected. So does the employment eﬀect, as it compares the employment choices under re-
structuring. For both eﬀects, the advantages of privatization are not considered as the eﬀects
concern diﬀerences in restructuring for the two types of government.
A similar story applies to the egoistic government: Only the labor cost eﬀect is inﬂuenced
by a better institutional environment. The unemployment eﬀect and the proﬁt eﬀect remain
unchanged. The distortions created by the labor cost eﬀect are smaller with better institutions.
The neglect of the positive aspects of expected wage payments is less important as expected
employment under privatization increases.27 The Political Economy of Privatization
6.4. Which government is worse? This question can be answered by a comparison of the
incentives to privatize of the voter-oriented and the egoistic government:
Proposition 7. Given ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize, the voter-oriented government




pV π(LV ) > w(pV LV − pPLP) − (1 + λ)w(pULU − pPLP) (25)
With better institutions, the egoistic government has less ineﬃcient incentives.
Proof. See appendix. 
By its high employment choice, the voter-oriented government diminishes the proﬁts of the
ﬁrm under restructuring. In addition, it has the incentive to give all revenues to the voters
and thus incurs the eﬃciency losses from redistribution. Thus, restructuring is relatively more
attractive for the egoistic government. On the other hand, the voter-oriented government eval-
uates the diﬀerence in the expected employment level between privatization and restructuring
positively with the wage. In contrast to that, the egoistic government only considers the saved
unemployment payments. Thus, restructuring is made relatively more attractive for the voter-
oriented government. Which eﬀect is stronger depends on the shape of the production and
probability functions. It is therefore not possible to state general results.
Yet, with comparative statics, it can be shown that the incentives of the voter-oriented gov-
ernment are the more distorted than those of the egoistic government the better the institutional
environment. To see this, look at the right hand side of condition 25. (The left hand side of
inequality 25 is unaﬀected by a changing institutional environment.) The advantage of restruc-
turing, higher expected employment, is valued higher by the voter-oriented government. With
better institutions, expected employment under privatization is increased and this advantage
of restructuring is reduced. This reduction now has a greater impact for the voter-oriented
government than for the egoistic government.
With better institutions, egoistic governments are better in the sense that they choose in-
eﬃcient privatization programs in less cases than voter-oriented governments. This may seem
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main burden of privatization if they become unemployed. Yet, the model compares incentives
to the social optimum. This is not equal to the policy choice preferred by the citizens.
7. Empirical Observations
To illustrate the results of the model with empirical observations, this section uses some data
for transition countries. It is diﬃcult to asses from the empirical observations whether there
has been too much or too little privatization. Yet, the privatization progress can be measured:
The EBRD index of privatization progress for large-scale enterprizes ranges from +1 to +4,
where +1 denotes little, and +4 denotes full privatization of large enterprizes (more than 75%
privately-owned capital with eﬀective management control). The data are collected in table 3.16
With the EBRD index of privatization progress, the countries that have achieved an almost
complete privatization can be identiﬁed. These countries cannot have privatized too little and
are thus the obvious candidates for an investigation on ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize.
Which countries belong to the group of voter-oriented governments and which to the revenue-
oriented ones? The decision on the privatization price distinguishes these government types:
Voter-oriented governments in the model give away the ﬁrm for free to the voters. In reality,
voucher privatization is such a way of distributing the ownership right of the ﬁrms among
the population. Egoistic, or revenue-oriented governments sell the ﬁrm at the highest possible
price. The second column of table 3 shows the predominant privatization method in a country:
privatization to insiders (managers and workers of the ﬁrm), by sale of the ﬁrm, or by vouchers.17
The development of GDP does not directly measure the eﬃciency of privatization. However,
it can capture the success of privatization programs: An eﬃcient privatization choice should
enhance growth more than if ineﬃcient privatization programs are undertaken. Note that the
data does not show when in the period from 1990 to 2001 the privatization programs were
implemented. Eventual diﬃculties in the adjustment process thus cannot be taken into account.
For the countries with high privatization scores (> 3), Estonia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Lithuania,
Romania, and Russia show a decrease of GDP. The Czech Republic has experienced almost no
16Schnitzer (2003), puts the privatization progress for large enterprizes in relation to the change in GDP
from 1990 to 2001 in that country. EBRD index from Transition Report (various years), GDP data from Madison
(2001), cited from Schnitzer (2003). Unemployment data and privatization method from Transition Report (2003).
17The possibility of insider privatization is not modelled in the paper. See Blanchard and Aghion (1996).29 The Political Economy of Privatization
Figure 3. Large-Scale Privatization on GDP and Unemployment in 2001
Privatization Privatization GDP 2001/ Unemployed 2001
Progress Method GDP 1990 (%) (% of labor force)
Czech Republic 4 voucher 102.9 8.9
Estonia 4 sale 96.7 12.6
Hungary 4 sale 112.3 5.7
Slovak Republic 4 sale 110.1 19.8
Bulgaria 3.7 sale 85.9 19.7
Georgia 3.3 voucher 39.6 11.1
Lithuania 3.3 voucher 72.3 17.4
Poland 3.3 sale 145.0 17.3
Romania 3.3 insider 83.6 8.8
Russia 3.3 voucher 69.2 8.9
Armenia 3 voucher 74.3 9.6
Croatia 3 insider 90.4 15.8
FYR Macedonia 3 insider 82.6 28.9
Kazakstan 3 sale 78.0 10.4
Kyrgyz Republic 3 voucher 69.8 17.4
Latvia 3 sale 66.8 13.1
Moldova 3 sale 34.6 7.3
Slovenia 3 insider 123.8 5.9
Ukraine 3 insider 47.1 3.7
Uzbekistan 2.7 insider 102.5 0.4
Albania 2.3 insider 122.2 14.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.3 voucher 68.9 39.7
Tajikistan 2.3 sale 39.5 2.3
Azerbaijan 2 voucher 64.3 1.3
Belarus 1 insider 90.3 2.3
Turkmenistan 1 insider 95.7 n.a.
growth over that period, whereas the GDP in Hungary, the Slovak Republic, and Poland has
increased substantially. Has the ﬁrst group of countries privatized too much? To relate the
empirical observations to the model, look at the unemployment levels in these countries.18
In the model, voter-oriented governments have too high incentives to privatize when the
employment eﬀect is weak. Then, the employment diﬀerences between privatization and re-
structuring cannot be too large. From the data, it is impossible to see how employment would
have developed if a restructuring of the ﬁrms had been chosen instead of privatization. Still,
18There are several problems with using oﬃcial unemployment statistics as they might not or in some cases not
at all capture the real level of unemployment. As the data here is only used as an illustration of the theoretical
results, a critical discussion of these issues is omitted.The Political Economy of Privatization 30
a low level of unemployment is a sign for a weak employment eﬀect: There is no possibility
for a government to signiﬁcantly increase employment. Of the countries with large privatiza-
tion progress, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Lithuania and Russia have applied the method of
voucher privatization. All these countries have experienced a decrease, or, in the case of the
Czech Republic, only a very weak increase of their GDP.
Have these countries privatized too much? In the context of the model, the failure of privati-
zation programs in these countries has a simple explanation: These countries have implemented
too much privatization. For the governments of that countries, the incentives to privatize could
have been ineﬃciently high when privatization did not imply a large number of unemployed.
This could be true for the Czech Republic and Russia which report unemployment levels below
10% and, with caution, for Georgia, whose reported unemployment with 11.1% is relatively low.
The incentive to keep the ﬁrms in state ownership to keep up employment and satisfy voters
has been weak.19 With its unemployment level of 17.4%, Lithuania falls out of that picture.
Estonia, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, and Poland have privatized by sales of
the state-owned ﬁrms. They thus belong to the group of revenue-oriented governments. In
the model, also egoistic governments may privatize too much, underestimating the positive
employment eﬀects of restructuring.20 All countries in this group except for Hungary have
unemployment ratios of over 10%. This points to a situation where proﬁts are valued more than
employment. Then, proﬁt-oriented governments have ineﬃciently high privatization incentives.
On the other hand, except for Bulgaria, these countries show a positive development of their
GDP. Too much privatization here has been by far less detrimental than for the group of govern-
ments that used voucher privatization. That pattern can be explained by improving institutions:
With a better economic and institutional environment, the incentives of the egoistic government
are less distorted than those of the voter-oriented government. Thus, governments using priva-
tization by sale would do that more eﬃciently than those using voucher privatization. For the
19For the case of Russia, insiders of ﬁrms had advantages during the voucher privatization. Firms were
predominantly owned by insiders with a vested interest in employment. This could be an additional explanation
for the relatively low unemployment levels.
20Note that egoistic governments do not have to be non-democratic. They just have to value government
revenue more than the utility of the voters.31 The Political Economy of Privatization
EU-accession countries Hungary, the Slovak Republic, and Poland, this explanation seems to
hold: These countries face a high pressure to improve their institutions to meet EU standards.
Another explanation could be that privatization by sales led to ownership structures that
supported a more eﬃcient reorganization of the ﬁrms after privatization: Firms are often sold
to large and/or foreign investors with an interest in proﬁt maximization. Under voucher priva-
tization, either insiders, as in Russia, or badly regulated investment funds with other interests
than reorganizing the ﬁrms gained control.21
It is very hard to track down the results of the model in the data. A detailed study would be
needed to assess the inﬂuence of the employment eﬀects of privatization. These are crucial for
the results of the model. Yet, empirical studies on the employment consequences of privatiza-
tion programs are rare. Megginson and Netter (2001) consider an analysis of the employment
consequences of privatization as one of the three most important empirical research projects.
There are a few empirical studies that ask for the reasons why governments choose privatiza-
tion. In the rest of this section, their ﬁndings are related to the results of the present model. In
the model, all types of government can have ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize. Thus, the
result does not only depend on the objective function of the government. The two government
types considered are stylized and extreme versions of existing governments. As both extreme
government types have the same ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize, it is plausible that also
intermediate forms will show a similar incentive structure.
This is not in line with the empirical ﬁndings of Bortolotti, Fantini, and Sinisalco (2003).
In their cross-section study that contains both developed and developing countries, they ﬁnd
that the probability of privatization signiﬁcantly increases for democracies. Yet, the mechanism
driving the result is diﬀerent: In their study, democracy is an indicator for political stability. This
attracts foreign investors which are necessary for a proﬁtable privatization. In the present model,
employment eﬀects are the driving force behind the ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize.
Furthermore, the model analyzes the incentives for privatization. It could well be that a non-
democratic government has very high incentives to privatize but is not able to implement the
privatization programs because it is unable to ﬁnd investors.
21Schnitzer (2003) discusses the importance of privatization strategies for the success of privatization programs.The Political Economy of Privatization 32
The study also reports that the probability of privatization signiﬁcantly increases with a
country’s debt. Revenue creation is identiﬁed as a strong incentive for privatization. This very
intuitive mechanism is neglected in the present model. An inclusion of that motive would further
reinforce the incentives to privatize.22 With any small distortions concerning debt servicing also
the result of ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize would be strengthened.
A ﬁnding by Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003) is that a higher number of veto players in a political
system decreases the probability of privatization. Intuitively, without opposition, all kinds of
political reforms are easier to implement. The present model omits the presence of veto players.23
It is plausible that the ineﬃciency of incentives to privatize can be reduced by such veto players.
Nevertheless, the present model makes an important contribution: It analyzes the incentives of
governments to privatize for diﬀerent objectives of the political leaders. Veto players might either
distort these incentives or create obstacles for the implementation of a privatization program.24
8. Conclusion
Why do governments want privatization? When the political leaders are voter-oriented, they
may privatize too much when higher employment under restructuring does not substantially
increase the expected income of the voters. Furthermore, as in Biais and Perotti (2002) and
Schmidt (1996), they use underpricing. Privatization is then used as a way to “buy” voters.
Egoistic governments have ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize due to their proﬁt orientation:
This makes them neglect the positive aspect of employment that is higher under restructuring.
The results are contrary to the ﬁndings of Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) that imply
that self-interested governments have no incentive to privatize. Their model has a diﬀerent
focus, namely, to explain why privatization can improve eﬃciency. The political leadership is
interested in a high employment level. It is more costly to inﬂuence the employment level of the
ﬁrm when the ﬁrm is privatized. In the present model, the political leadership has additional
possibilities of action: the choice of the privatization price and the redistribution of proﬁts of the
22Yarrow (1999) theoretically builds on that argument.
23The most obvious candidates are the unemployed: They would play a role if elections would be decided
retrospectively, that is, not on the basis of the expected but of the realized income of voters.
24Bennedsen (2000) has a model of privatization and employment choice with interest groups. However, his
focus does not lie on the incentives for privatization.33 The Political Economy of Privatization
state-owned ﬁrm to voters. These elements are important factors of the privatization decision.
When they are taken into account, the model yields the contrary results. Furthermore, diﬀerent
types of government are considered. Thus, it is possible to distinguish the inﬂuence of diﬀerent
government objectives on the privatization decision: Both the orientation on political power and
on government proﬁts can lead to ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize.
In the model, private investors have incentives to reorganize the ﬁrm. In reality, however, this
might be otherwise: When a ﬁrm is privatized to insiders of the ﬁrm, they may have interests
other than eﬃcient production. When there is a large group of investors, they may encounter
monitoring problems. In such cases, privatization could not only be triggered by ineﬃcient
incentives but would also have detrimental consequences. Managers and employees but also
large investors play a powerful role in any privatization decision. The inﬂuence of pressure
groups is closely related to the choice of the privatization strategy. This is an interesting topic
for further research: Schnitzer (2003) points out that a wrong privatization strategy could create
or strengthen pressure groups that might be an obstacle to future necessary reforms. Possibly,
a dynamic framework could best capture this idea.
For all government types, the ineﬃciency of privatization incentives is reduced with a better
institutional environment. This leads to the conclusion that privatization is more eﬃcient in
countries with a developed economic environment. Also, privatization projects that are enforced
by outside pressure are less detrimental in well-developed economies. It follows that privatization
programs in less developed economies should be considered with more caution. From a political
economy point of view, it is not clear whether privatization in such countries enhances welfare.
The program of the World Bank to make privatization a prerequisite for successful economic
reforms is not supported by this model. The results show that privatization cannot be the
panacea for eﬃciency problems in the state-owned sector. Wrong incentives can distort the
privatization outcome in a way that makes this measure undesirable. A close examination of
the economic situation in a country and the success probabilities of reforms is needed in order
to assess whether privatization programs are able to improve a country’s situation.The Political Economy of Privatization 34
9. Appendix
9.1. Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. For the welfare-oriented government with better institutions, it is optimal to choose
privatization whenever
pBI
P π(LP) − pRπ(LR) > (w + λw)(pRLR − pBI
P LP) (26)
It is easy to see that with pBI
P > pP, the left hand side of the equation increases whereas the right
hand side decreases. Thus, the social planner unambiguously chooses more privatization. This is
because the larger success probability for privatization programs both increases the proﬁts from
privatization and reduces the expected unemployment. For the same reasons, the incentives for





pV π(LV ) > w(pV LV − pBI
P LP)
To see that the eﬀect is stronger for the welfare-oriented government, consider the following
condition for the voter-oriented government. The voter-oriented government has ineﬃciently




pV π(LV ) + λw(pRLR − pBI
P LP) > w(pV LV − pRLR)
The only term that changes with an increasing pP is λw(pRLR − pBI
P LP). This term decreases
with pP as the higher expected employment under privatization reduces the eﬃciency losses of
redistribution. Overall, the condition thus becomes tighter. This means that the voter-oriented
government has ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize for smaller parameter ranges.
Also the egoistic government has higher incentives to privatize: Higher expected proﬁts under
privatization and lower unemployment costs both drive the result in the same direction.
pBI
P π(LP) − pUπ(LU) > (1 + λ)w(pULU − pBI
P LP)
Also the ineﬃciently high incentives for the egoistic government decrease with pP: The egoistic
government has ineﬃciently high incentives to privatize if and only if UP − UR > WP − WR.
This is the case when
w(pRLR − pBI
P LP) + λw(pRLR − pULU) > pUπ(LU) − pRπ(LR) + w(pULU − pBI
P LP)35 The Political Economy of Privatization
Here, the changing terms are also the ones concerning the now higher expected employment
level: If w(pRLR −pBI
P LP)−w(pULU −pBI
P LP) has decreased with respect to the case with pP,
the above condition is unambiguously tighter:
w(pRLR − pBI
P LP) − w(pULU − pBI
P LP) = wpRLR − wpULU − pBI
P LP(w − w)
The last term increases with pP. Thus, the above condition has become tighter for the egoistic
government. 
9.2. Proof of Proposition 7.
Proof. Condition 25 is derived from conditions 11, 15, 18, and 22. To see that the incentives for





pV π(LV ) > w(pV LV − pBI
P LP) − (1 + λ)w(pULU − pBI
P LP)
The left-hand side of this condition is not aﬀect by a change in the institutional environment.
The right hand side can be re-written as wpV LV −(1+λ)wpULU −[w −(1+λ)w]pBI
P LP. Only
the last term increases with better institutions, as pBI
P > pP. This means that the left hand side
of condition 25 is reduced with better institutions. The voter-oriented government has higher
incentives to privatize than the egoistic government for a larger parameter range, the better the
institutional environment in the economy. 
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